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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : 
vs. : 
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN, : 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
: Case No. 920823-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State makes several errors in its argument that the corpus 
delicti of the crime with which Mr. Hansen is charged was 
established prior to admitting Mr. Hansen's confession. 
First is the State's contention that proof of identification 
is not required to establish corpus delicti. That is an overly 
broad generalization, which the United States Supreme Court 
denounced in Smith v. United States of America, 348 U.S. 147 (Oct. 
term 1954). Under the Smith rule, crimes which require the 
identity of the accused to be known in order for a crime to lie, 
should receive a higher level of protection than the general corpus 
delicti rule. That rule applies here. 
Second, the state misunderstands the context of State v. 
Johnson, 821 P. 2d 1150, 1162, wherein the court makes a general 
statement that the state is not required to show independent 
evidence "that the accused is the guilty agent." Johnson is a case 
that deals with the issue of whether proof of a crime is necessary 
to allow pre-crime inculpatory statements to be admitted. 
According to the Johnson court, the issue of what evidence is 
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necessary to prove a crime has been committed is a seperate inquiry 
under the corpus delicti rule. 
Third, the State misunderstands the legal meaning of the word 
"injury" in the corpus delicti rule, rendering their arguments 
legally impotent. The State erroneously substitutes a common 
medical meaning for the word "injury" in place of the technical 
legal meaning. The State believes that the "injury" component of 
the rule is satisfied by the head wound received by the accident 
victim. However, case law in this jurisdiction states that 
evidence must be presented that the "injury specified in the crime" 
occured. The injury specified in the crime charged is the illegal 
leaving of an accident scene by a motor vehicle operator. 
Finally, the State improperly accuses Mr. Hansen of an 
additional crime for the first time on appeal, the crime of 
illegally crossing the median strip of 1-15. Mr. Hansen was 
neither charged nor tried for such a crime, and the trial court 
judge did not consider it in his decision. The State assumes the 
role of judge and jury, and asks the Court of Appeals to affirm Mr. 
Hansen's convictions on the basis of the purely speculative 
criminality embodied in a non-existent criminal charge. 
Ii is prejudicial, and a violation of Mr. Hansen's 
constitutional rights to a fair trial and the due process of law, 
for the State to impute criminal guilt to Mr. Hansen without his 
having been charged or tried. 
Because of the egregious faults in the State's argument and 
the failure of the State to provide independent, clear and 
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convincing proof that a crime was even committed, this conviction 
should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
"the state concedes that the there [sic] must be a 
showing by clear and convincing evidence, independent of 
the Defendant's confession, that the person who left the 
scene of the accident was the driver. That is because if 
it was the driver who was mortally injured, and it was 
the passenger who left the scene, there is no crime for 
which the passenger could be convicted. And thus, the 
criminal connection to the injury could not be 
established." (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p.10) 
This admission by Mr. Davis, the Deputy Utah County Attorney, 
is a concise and accurate restatement of the argument to which the 
Defendant adheres. The pivotal portion of the above statement is 
that "there must be a showing by clear and convincing evidence, 
independent of the Defendant's confession, that the person who left 
the scene of the accident was the driver." 
The "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard, mentioned 
above, establishes the extent of the State's burden in proving that 
a crime has been committed before a confession can be admitted at 
trial. The reasoning used by the trial judge shows that the state 
failed to meet that burden. 
In denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court 
judge stated that he recognized that the question of the operator 
of the vehicle and the identity of the person committing the 
offense must be answered the same in order to convict. The judge 
had allowed the confession for purposes of identifying the 
operator, reasoning that sufficient corroborating evidence had been 
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presented and that the confession is what "makes the difference." 
(Trial Transcript at pg. 60) 
However, the purpose of corroborative evidence is not merely 
to set up the confession so that the confession can then "make the 
difference." The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the argument that 
"independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti need only 
be consistent with and tend to * confirm and strengthen the 
confession.'" (citation omitted) State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1163 (Utah 1991). 
In the case at bar, the judge was clearly following the 
discredited theory that "corroborative evidence of the corpus 
delicti need only..*confirm and strengthen the confession.,n As 
mentioned in the preceding paragraph, State v. Johnson, 821 P. 2d at 
1163, makes it the law in this state that such evidence does not 
meet the clear and convincing standard. The State's own summary of 
the evidence presented shows that it did not accomplish anything 
more than to "confirm and strengthen" Mr. Hansen's confession, and 
that the real basis of the corpus delici was the confession itself. 
The State summarized the evidence that they presented at trial 
as follows: 
"The evidence indicates that the vehicle rolled once and came 
to rest on the passenger side, that the injured person was 
trapped underneath the passenger side and had received mortal 
injuries to the head, that blood was found where the passenger 
window of the vehicle came to rest, and that the other 
occupant of the vehicle exited from the driver's window 
shortly after the accident." (Trial Transcript at p. 10) 
The Defendant stipulates to those facts, but asserts that 
those facts can only serve to "confirm and strengthen the 
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confession." None of them provide independent, clear and 
convincing evidence that a crime was committed, because none of 
those facts clearly show the identity of the driver. 
The State asserts that it is "not required to show independent 
evidence 'that the accused is the guilty agent./,f [Brief of 
Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 8; quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 
1162 (Utah 1991)] In order for the State's argument to succeed, 
that assertion must be true without exception. However, it is the 
position of the defendant that an exception exists in cases where 
it cannot be shown that a crime has been committed without 
identifying the accused. The exception was recognized and created 
by the United States Supreme Court. 
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154, 99 L.ed. 192, 
199, 75 S. Ct. 194 (1954), the Court addressed the corpus delicti 
rule in the context of a tax fraud case where the identity of the 
taxpayer was an element of the cause of action. The Court 
recognized that: 
"as to this crime, it cannot be shown that the crime has 
been committed without identifying the accused. Thus we 
are faced with the choice of either applying the 
corroboration rule to this offense and according the 
accused even greater protection than the rule affords to 
a defendant in a homicide prosecution, (string cite 
omitted), or of finding the rule wholly inapplicable 
because of the nature of the offense, stripping the 
accused of this guarantee altogether. We choose to apply 
the rule, with its broader guarantee, to crimes .... 
where the corroborative evidence must implicate the 
accused in order to show that a crime has been 
committed." Smith, 99 L.ed. 192, 199. 
The case at bar is a crime where the "corroborative evidence 
must implicate the accused" as the operator of the vehicle or the 
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charges cannot stand. The only corroborating evidence presented at 
trial, other than the confession, merely tended to put someone in 
the car who was wearing clothes similar to clothes worn by Mr. 
Hansen the next day. [Trial Transcript at pp.S^/^S, 24^ *2.^  
No direct evidence indicated that the similarly dressed person 
was the operator of the car. From the evidence presented, it is 
just as likely that the person was the passenger, and perhaps more 
likely considering that the victim was the owner of the car, not 
Mr. Hansen. [Trial Transcript at p.VO] 
Even the Johnson rule, upon which the State bases its entire 
argument, is not as straightforward as the State makes it appear in 
its Brief. The quoted sentence from Johnson, stating that it is 
not necessary to show independently that the accused is the guilty 
agent, is immediately proceeded by footnote #8, in which the court 
distinguishes Johnson from cases where the issue is what quantum of 
evidence is necessary to prove a crime has been committed. The 
court states: 
"We note that some confusion has arisen surrounding 
corpus delicti because the term has more than one use. 
This case involves the question of when proof of the 
crime is required to allow introduction of a defendant's 
confession. In another context, corpus delicti refers to 
evidence that the crime was committed." [Johnson at 
1162, footnote 8.] 
Johnson was an appellate case that examined the issue of 
whether statements against interest, made by the defendant before 
the crime was committed, should have been afforded the protection 
of the corpus delicti rule. [Johnson at 1163-1164] Therefore, 
carte blanche reliance on Johnson would be misplaced in the context 
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of the case at bar, because the case at bar does not involve any 
statements of Mr. Hansen made before the accident occurred. 
Rather, the issue is whether the state provided enough independent 
evidence that a crime was committed to allow the defendant's post-
arrest confession to be admitted, where the state must prove the 
identity of the guilty agent to show that there was a crime. 
Although the Smith rule should be dispositive in this case, 
other portions of the State's argument are seriously flawed. The 
State incorrectly applies the facts of the case to both elements of 
the corpus delicti rule. 
The first element of the rule is that independent evidence 
must show that a "wrong, an injury, or a damage" has been done. 
[Johnson at 1162] The State claims that the injury prong of the 
rule is satisfied by "either the mortal injury received by the one 
occupant of the vehicle, or the leaving of the mortally injured man 
by the other occupant." [Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 9] 
The State confuses medical injury with legal injury. 
However, State v. Knoefler, 563 P. 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977), 
quoted in Johnson at 1162, holds that the State must provide 
independent evidence that the "injury specified in the crime 
occurred, and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal 
conduct." (emphasis added) Mr. Hansen was not charged with 
causing the injury or death of the other occupant of the vehicle, 
and no citizen is under an affirmative duty to render aid to 
persons in need of medical attention. The injury specified in the 
crime charged was that a driver allegedly left the scene of an 
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injury accident without filing a report. In order to prove that 
such a crime occurred, the State must show which occupant of the 
car was the driver, something they have consistently failed to do. 
Not only does the State's argument fail to establish the first 
prong of the corpus delicti rule, the second prong is equally 
unfulfilled by the reasoning of the State. The State knows that if 
they cannot independently prove that Mr. Hansen was the driver of 
the vehicle, then they cannot prove that the "injury" was caused by 
someone's criminal conduct. Accordingly, the State has attempted 
to manufacture a very dubious "criminal conduct" which they hope to 
attribute to Mr. Hansen without having to adhere to the rule that 
the scope of review on appeal is limited to the record created by 
the court below. 
The State claims that because the vehicle rolled across the 
median, Mr. Hansen is guilty of criminally "operating" a vehicle 
"over, across or within" a the median of a divided highway, as 
prohibited by Utah Code Annotated, § 46-6-63.10(2). This reasoning 
again shows the lack of understanding which the State has in 
regards to the corpus delicti rule. Even if Mr. Hansen stood 
convicted of this crime, it would not provide corpus delicti for 
any other crimes charged at trial. But first we must examine the 
validity of the State's self-serving prognostication that 
conviction for such a crime would be inevitable. 
In the first place, a vehicle that is out of control is not 
being "operated" by the driver. Second, commission of a crime 
requires a criminal mens rea. The fact that the incident was an 
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automobile "accident" necessarily eliminates the possibility of 
criminal intent in crossing the median — it was not intentional, 
it was accidental. Third, the State has not shown that it was Mr. 
Hansen that operated the vehicle in the median — so once again, no 
criminal conduct can be imputed to him. Finally, the Defendant has 
not been able to find any case law where a driver in a roll-over 
accident was charged with illegally operating a vehicle in the 
median of a divided highway. 
Even if the State could prove that Mr. Hansen is guilty of 
crossing the median, the corpus delicti has not been established 
for any other crime which arises out of the same factual 
circumstances. Utah case law does not address this specific issue, 
but case law from other jurisdictions mandates independent evidence 
for each crime charged. In a 1986 murder-rape case, the Illinois 
Court of Appeals ruled that "independent evidence of one offense 
does not allow use of a defendant's confession for all crimes for 
which the defendant is charged." People v. Kokoraleis, 501 NE 2d 
207, 227 (111. App. 1986). 
Finally, the defendant strongly protests the illegitimate 
attempt of the State to impute guilt to Mr. Hansen for a criminal 
charge which was never even mentioned at the trial level. Mr. 
Hansen was not charged with operating a vehicle in the median, was 
not tried, did not have a chance to defend himself, had no notice 
that the State would accuse him on appeal, and cannot properly 
prepare an appeal based on non-existent criminal charges and 
suppositional reasoning as to what the trial court judge would have 
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done had he had the chance to consider this entirely new 
accusation. The appeal must be based on the record below, not 
imaginary convictions. 
It is unthinkable that the State could be allowed to bring 
additional criminal charges for the first time on appeal. To 
actually base a substantial portion of the State's argument on an 
opaquely related crime that "very well could have been charged," 
but was not, shows the flawed character of the State's theory and 
analysis. If convictions could be affirmed by raising criminal 
charges for the first time on appeal, and skipping the trial 
process altogether, the financial cost to the public would 
certainly be lowered, but the price we all would pay in lost 
constitutional freedoms would be unbearable. 
As a matter of public policy, there are two reasons that the 
convictions of Mr. Hansen should be overturned. First, if the 
State is allowed to secure a conviction without independently 
identifying Mr. Hansen as the driver, the corpus delicti rule will 
be diluted, "stripping the accused of this guarantee altogether." 
If it cannot be shown that a crime has been committed without 
identifying the accused, the State must not be allowed to convict 
citizens primarily on the basis of a confession. The corpus 
delicti rule was established to make sure that people are not 
convicted on the strength of false confessions. 
Second, the Court should send a signal to County Attorneys 
that result oriented procedures will not be tolerated. One of the 
secondary reasons for the corpus delicti rule is to force 
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prosecutors to do thorough investigations and call the witnesses 
necessary to establish that a crime was committed. This is doubly 
important in factual scenarios where the state must identify the 
accused in order to show that a crime was committed. If the State 
is allowed to prosecute and convict anybody that comes forward and 
confesses to a crime under such factual circumstances, then no 
corpus delicti protection exists for those people. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests 
that the Trial Court's conviction be reversed in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7 day of May, 1993. 
Cleve J. £a£ch 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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